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US immigration enforcement has led to a rise in the number of deportations. 
Several studies identify deportees as more likely to attempt re-entry to reunify with 
family members in a variety of international settings. These demographic changes 
have prompted some scholars to theorize how deportation produces a unique 
mobility subject: the unintended returnee. The importance of studying unintended 
returnees is amplified when we examine the 3.1 million unauthorized migrants 
deported by the US between 2005-2013. Over 1.5 million children living in the US 
were impacted by these removals. Data from the US Department of Homeland 
Security, indicate that among those who remigrate, the majority are those with US 
born children. While unauthorized reentry, is not new, the forms that return 
migrations take reveal changes in the organization of clandestine border-crossings 
that heighten the risk of violence. To provide insight on how these changes may 
impact deportees who remigrate, this article examines the chain of events that 
followed a 2006 immigration work-site raid and deportation of a migrant who was 
separated from his US based family. The concept of clandestinity – licit and illicit 
strategies that enable surreptitious cross-border mobility – is employed to 
understand how this person, following deportation, leverages his involvement in a 
human smuggling network as a smuggler (coyote) to reenter without authorization. 
By drawing inferences from a single case, I elucidate how immigration enforcement 
measures, along with limited avenues for humanitarian relief, may create 
conditions that compel deportees to defy the power of the state to produce 
involuntary transnational families and rely on illicit clandestine migration services 





Since 2004, I have conducted ethnographic fieldwork with indigenous Maya 
from Guatemala in the state of Chiapas, Mexico. In 2007, in one of my return trips, 
I met Alex1 and his wife Grace in Chiapas. Grace, originally born in Guatemala, 
fled as a child (age 9) with her brother (age 14) to escape military conflict from the 
country’s civil war (1954-1996) and join their parents in the US. Alex was born in 
a refugee settlement in Mexico to parents who, like Grace and her family, fled from 
                                                     
1 To maintain anonymity, pseudonyms are used throughout.  
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Guatemala’s military conflict. Barriers to incorporation – visa restrictions to mobility 
(Kauffer Michel 2002) and discrimination that limited employment options in 
Mexico – compelled Alex to migrate to the US at age 14 to assist his family.2 Grace 
met Alex two years after his arrival, had a US born child, and lived in the US for 12 
and 6 years, respectively. 
In 2006, Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) agents conducted an 
immigration raid at his place of work.3 A new provision, “expedited removal”, within 
the 1996 Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 
normalized deportation as a mechanism for immigration enforcement was used to 
accelerate the deportations during the 2006 ICE worksite raids.4 The immigration 
enforcement operation led to the incarceration and deportation of Alex and many 
of his co-workers, but also separated families impacting hundreds of children in 
the US5 Alex’s deportation to Nogales, Mexico at 1 am, without any form of 
documentation6 or money, placed him in great vulnerability. A Mexican national 
gave him some cash to call Grace, and served as an intermediary to receive wired 
money, which Alex used to join his family in Chiapas.  
                                                     
2 For information on barriers to incorporation of Guatemalan refugees in Mexico that fueled 
international migration to the US see Gil-García (2015). 
3 The immigration raid discussed here was part of a larger ICE enforcement operation that took 
place across six sites throughout two states. For a systematic analysis of the large scale impact 
these raids had on families and communities see Capps, Castañeda et al. (2007). 
4 The provision “allows summary expulsions of non-citizens who have not been admitted or 
paroled into the US, have been in the US for less than two years, and who are inadmissible 
because they presented fraudulent documents or have no documents” (Campos et al. 2014, 5). 
5 The total number of children impacted by arrest is based on information obtained from service 
providers, and as it excludes those impacted by deportations, the precise number of children and 
families impacted by deportations is unknown (Capps et al. 2007).  
6 For fear of being accused of identity theft (a punishable offense) for the use of someone else’s 
social security card, he did not disclose to ICE agents that his wallet was left in his car. 
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Deportation caused significant economic hardship for Alex’s family. 
Scholars have identified more than 90% of noncitizens deported from the US in 
recent years are men, and as fathers are generally the breadwinners in immigrant 
families, when fathers are arrested or deported in large worksite raids, families lose 
almost all of their income (Chaudry et al. 2010). Such circumstances reflected 
Grace’s experience. As a stay-at-home mom, she did not participate in the labor 
market, and relied on her husband’s source of income. Consequently, to avoid 
greater financial strain, Grace moved in with her parents. She also initiated the 
process to obtain a US passport for her child, but required that Alex sign a 
notarized document, prolonging their separation. After an additional six months, 
both joined him in Chiapas to become “de facto” deportees.7  
As opposed to being forcibly removed by the state as Alex was, de facto 
deportation occurs when parents make the involuntary decision to take their 
foreign national child back or US citizen-child to another country (Colvin 2008). 
The latter of the two, however, according to psychologist and migration scholar 
Luis Zayas (2015), abrogates the young citizens’ rights and coerces them into a 
state of exile.8 Along with US citizen exiles, scholars have identified how deportees 
who may have also lived part or most of their lives in the US confront stigma 
(McGuire and Coutin 2013) and economic vulnerability (Bengtson et al. 2013) that 
preclude their integration following deportation. 
                                                     
7 Interview dated July 25, 2014. 
8 Passel et al. (2012) estimate as many as 500,000 US citizens remain in exile. Their figures, 
however, may be greater as of this writing. US citizen children placed in exile status, “may be 
subject to greater economic hardship; a weaker social safety net; difficulties in school; and, 
potentially, the threat of social instability and physical danger” (Capps and Fix 2013, 87, see too 
Cave 2012). 
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 Indeed, significant economic upheaval ensued following Alex’s deportation 
and family’s involuntary mobility to Mexico. All moved-in to Alex’s family’s small 
(20 x 20-meter lot) home in Chiapas, where agricultural lands for cultivation are 
not available. The collapse of the coffee market in Chiapas (Collier 1994), where 
previous generations periodically traveled to the coast to cultivate and harvest, 
made this option economically unfeasible. Outside of migrating to the US, a 
significant number of community residents emigrate to the Mayan Riviera to work 
in the poorly remunerated gendered informal labor sector: construction work for 
men, and hospitality for women (Gil-García 2015).  
 Within a year of his deportation, Alex befriended a coyote (human smuggler) 
and accompanied him on a series of trips across the Mexico-US border. The higher 
earnings Alex gained as a coyote and greater flexibility to spend time with his family 




  My presentation and analysis are based on a combination of published 
sources and four one hour-long informal interviews with Alex in 2014. His wife and 
seven community members (3 men, 4 women), who relied on Alex to smuggle kin 
to the US, participated in three informal focus group interviews in 2014 (between 
30 minutes and one hour); all confirmed the veracity of his accounts. My 
longstanding rapport with participants and secondary sources – peer-reviewed 
scholarship and journalistic reports on human smuggling on the Mexico-US border 
– confirm their observations.  
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  In 2015, following his capture and detention by Customs and Border 
Protection (CBP) agents, legal options for release was obtained from his attorney. 
Follow-up telephone interviews with Alex regarding his work as a coyote took place 
in 2016. While being in the US in violation of immigration laws is generally a civil 
violation, actually smuggling other individuals into the US is considered a federal 
crime. Scholars (Brabeck et al. 2015) have identified how case law has been 
variable on the ability to maintain human subjects protections; the federal 
government could take an interest in prosecuting him, and subpoena me to testify 
or provide records.  
Consequently, to fulfill participants’ request to maintain confidentiality and 
anonymity, and to diminish the risk of producing participant records to comply with 
a subpoena, field notes (in lieu of audio recordings) de-identified subjects through 
use of pseudonyms throughout fieldwork. Hopkins (2008) has mentioned, 
however, that to uphold confidentiality with vulnerable populations, it may be 
necessary to disguise particular details and information to prevent deductive 
disclosure (Kaiser 2009). As an additional precaution, to protect subjects, certain 
identifying details in this case have been altered, but findings have not been 
changed. 
 
What Distinguishes Contemporary Clandestine Migration from the Past? 
 
In an attempt to specify what differentiates contemporary migration from the 
past, Anthropologist, Deborah Boehm (2016), in her book Returned identifies how 
deportation from the US has produced a series of emergent migrations that include 
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– family members with diverse US immigration statuses, including US citizens, who 
return after deportation or migrate for the first time.  
Deportations from the US territory, for geographers Price and Breese 
(2016),  constitute a type of involuntary removal, and produce what they call 
unintended returnees. The rise in deportations of foreign nationals from Latin 
America, particularly from Central America – Guatemala, Honduras, and El 
Salvador – along with Mexico (between 2000-2013) accounted for 3.8 million 
removals (DHS 2014). Several scholars have explored the incorporation of 
deportees in countries of origin (Hamann and Zunñiga 2011, Anderson and Solis 
2014) with some identifying forms of marginalization upon return (Hagan, Castro, 
and Rodriguez 2010, Coutin 2010). While Price and Breese (2016) limit their 
discussion of unintended returnees to removals from US territory, they 
acknowledge that deportees could potentially return.  
Scholars, have identified how remigration is common, but due to the 
clandestine nature of remigration, estimates on their frequency vary (Massey, 
Durand, and Malone 2002, Van Hook and Zhang 2011). Several studies identify 
deportees as more likely to attempt re-entry in a variety of international settings 
(Riosmena and Massey 2010, Peutz 2006). Hagan et al. (2008) identified how 
substantial portions of deportees intend to remigrate to the US. For instance, 
empirical research among deportee men in El Salvador, revealed a greater 
propensity to remigrate among deportees with children, spouses, and among 
deportees with both spouse and children in the US than their counterparts without 
family ties (Cardoso et al. 2016).  
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 Cardoso and colleagues (2016) also found that Salvadoran deportees with 
family in the United States have substantial US-specific human capital – work 
experience, higher education, and English fluency – all important determinants of 
authorized and unauthorized remigration (Massey and Espinosa 1997), was 
substantially greater for deportees with family in the US than those without. 
Availability of US-specific human capital among study participants, however, was 
found to be inconsequential to the intent to remigrate. These findings run counter 
to the research literature’s emphasis on social capital – the information provided 
by migrant family networks that help lower the overhead costs to migrate – 
identified by Massey and Espinosa (1997) as a fundamental force that instigates 
and sustains more migration. Instead of benefitting from social capital the study’s 
authors found that involuntary transnational family structure served as the most 
important factor influencing the intent to remigrate (Cardoso et al. 2016, 217), 
despite severe penalties for unlawful re-entry to the US (Massey 2007).  
 The study by Cardoso and colleagues (2016) on the intention to remigrate 
among deportees helps shed light on the influence involuntary transnational 
families may have in shaping actual behavior among a population that represents 
a significant proportion of repeat migrants. For instance, data from the Department 
for Homeland Security (DHS), limited to migrant apprehensions that undercounts 
repeat migration among individuals not apprehended, identifies 21 percent of 
deportees in the US as repeat violators, whereas parents of US-citizen children 
constitute more than a third of repeat violations (DHS 2009).9 The Cardoso et al. 
                                                     
9 It is important to note that while a substantial proportion of deportee parents, the majority from 
Mexico and Central America (ICE 2015), may intend to remigrate, overall levels of migration from 
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(2016) study suggests that the social capital thesis of Massey and Espinosa 
(Massey and Espinosa 1997) and others (Durand, Massey, and Zenteno 2001) 
may no longer hold in explaining the return migration among deportee parents with 
children in the US.  
 Along with possible changes in the role US-specific social capital may play 
as a determining factor in return migration, the documented rise in the use of 
coyotes in the last decade in Mexico (EMIF 2011) indicate a greater likelihood 
among deportee parents to use clandestine means to remigrate. What is new 
about these return migrations is the nature and extent of vulnerabilities 
experienced within the larger clandestine political economy. 
There is on-going debate among scholars, however, about how clandestine 
crossings are organized; some argue that cartels do not have much involvement 
in human smuggling (Sanchez 2015), while others say they do (Gurney 2014). 
Greater consensus exists among scholars that restrictive immigration policies and 
tighter border controls by migrant receiving states like the US has fueled a diverse 
market for clandestine migration services (Andreas 1998, Slack and Whiteford 
2011).10 This diverse market according to Ortiz (2016) is part of a larger 
clandestine political economy fueled by the regulation of migration through border 
security along with cartel activity in drug-and people-smuggling.  
                                                     
Mexico are down (Krogstad and Passel 2015) – with some investigators suggesting net migration 
from Mexico is zero (Passel, D’Vera, and Gonzalez-Barrera 2012). 
10 Scholars have identified several clandestine strategies that enable cross-border mobility, which 
include: human smuggling, crossings with tourist visas or borrowed documents. See Chávez 
(2011) and Ortiz (2016). 
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To help comprehend Alex’s involvement in human smuggling, I deploy 
Spener’s (2009) concept of clandestinity as licit and illicit strategies that enable 
surreptitious cross-border mobility. Reliance on these strategies is tied to limits 
imposed by states to the legitimate means of movement that increasingly produce 
involuntary transnational families and reinforce the clandestine political economy. 
I also employ and broaden Price and Breese’s (2016, 374) concept of unintended 
returnee to illustrate how the structural constraints that befall Alex following his 
involuntary removal is part of a larger continuum that delimits the mobility options 
for deportees.  
Restrictions on the legal means to migrate may compel deportees, 
particularly among those with involuntary transnational families, to deploy 
clandestinity as a resource and contract coyotes to enable cross-border mobility. 
Deportees who remigrate to the US are subject to immigration enforcement that 
increasingly criminalizes non-violent offenses, particularly unauthorized re-entry 
(Ewing, Martínez, and Rumbaut 2015), raising the specter of possible jail time 
and/or another unintended return.  
My focus, however, is not on the clandestine practice of human smuggling 
per se. Instead, I am interested in examining how deportation of individuals with 
families serves as an incentive to attempt re-entry and the changing dynamics of 
clandestine crossings. My aim is to also elucidate through my case study how 
social capital, which helps lower overhead costs to migrating is of marginal 
importance when the migrant has been deported and separated from family 
members already in the US. Moreover, I will demonstrate how immigration 
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enforcement measures that fuel deportations and family separation restrict the 
legal avenues available to returnees who have credible fear claims to obtain 
humanitarian relief, which in turn erodes the fundamental right to family life, and 






The Hierarchical Organization of Human Smuggling from Central America 
and Mexico to the US 
 
Migration scholar David Spener (2009, 144) in Clandestine Crossings 
identifies how the commercial-transport business of border crossing is one of 
several strategies that are largely structured by “a loosely networked set of 
[decentralized] independent contractors.” Spener also found, through 
ethnographic interviews, analysis of court records, and surveys a high degree of 
relational embeddedness – defined as far-reaching yet relatively closed social 
networks – whereby most migrants form contracts with recommended coyotes in 
their hometowns. The strength of these networks generates a degree of trust 
necessary to order the illicit cash-on-delivery system of human smuggling.  
 Some scholars, however, have identified a loosening of these networks 
whereby migrants rely less on local ties established with known smugglers who 
may also be linked to drug cartels (Slack and Whiteford 2010). The participation of 
drug cartels in clandestine smuggling networks has been identified to increase the 
vulnerability of migrants who can compel coyotes to assault migrants or force them 
to transport drugs (Slack and Whiteford 2010). Ortiz (2016) argues that the 
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increased participation of imposters who pretend to be coyotes and recruit 
migrants only to extort them may inform Slack and Whiteford’s  (2010) findings, 
which has helped reinforce dominant perceptions of smuggling as intertwined with 
criminal syndicates (Spener 2009, Palacios 2012).  
Interviews conducted by Palacios (2012) with forty coyotes identifies 
unequal power relations between cartels who deploy violence to extract quotas 
from coyotes for the privilege of operating on the Mexican borderlands of 
Tamaulipas to facilitate cross-border migration. The association between the two 
– a common practice made by representatives of the US state security apparatus 
and humanitarian groups alike11 – “is actually produced by coercion and operates 
to the detriment of coyotes” (Palacios 2012, 58). This unequal power dynamic may 
help explain Ortiz’s (2016) ethnographic findings that bolstered border 
enforcement has resulted in more frequent cartel activity and involvement of 
coyotes in the movement of drugs with that of people across three major cities 
along the Mexico-US border. 
Bolstered immigration enforcement and changes in the organizational 
makeup of contemporary clandestine smuggling networks begin to explain the 
structural factors that contribute to migrant vulnerability when crossing the Mexico-
US border. Within this loose human smuggling network exist enganchadores who 
are charged with actively recruiting potential migrants. A coyote, according to Alex 
however, is more honest in his dealings with border-crossers, who unlike 
enganchadores, must encounter many of the same dangers faced by clients when 
                                                     
11 See HCHS (2006) and CNDH (2009). 
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crossing the border (hunger, thirst, injury, imprisonment, and death). While Alex 
portrays himself as an honest coyote, deception, coercion, and violent relations of 
power can take place throughout the smuggling milieu (Ortiz 2016, Palacios 2012).  
 The patrón plays a managerial role, which involves contracting 
enganchadores and coyotes, and regulating the cost and number of attempts that 
will be made to cross the international border. Apprehending a coyote by US 
border enforcement results in the loss of funds paid to the patrón, and denies 
clients another opportunity to cross the international border.  
 While Alex used the terms patrones, enganchadores, and coyotes to 
describe the organization of clandestine crossings, as David Spener’s (2014) 
recent work has shown, the lexicon varies greatly over time and space.12 The 
vernacular terms used to describe clandestine crossings by Alex may therefore 
differ in another context. His account, however, confirm other studies that identify 
a loosening of relationally embedded networks in clandestine human smuggling.  
Inequities embedded in the current clandestine political economy that 
require payment of costly quotas, places at a disadvantage less complex or 
embedded networks, which are linked to small scale clandestine migration 
(Palacios 2012). These inequities provide loose networks, or what Ortiz (2016) 
calls a “spatially segmented system” of independent contractors who may not 
necessarily know each other, a competitive advantage. This loose organization 
has been identified as an effective protection mechanism to prevent identification 
of parties involved in the smuggling operation in the event a facilitator is arrested 
                                                     
12 For a review of the lexicon used to coordinate irregular clandestine crossings from the 
Mediterranean to the European Union see (Achilli, 2016) 
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(Zhang 2008). As a result, complex spatially segmented networks have been 
identified as the primary mechanism used by larger numbers of migrants from 
across the world to surreptitiously cross the US-Mexico borderlands (Palacios 
2012).  
 
Negotiations between Patrones, Coyotes, and Enganchadores 
 
By the summer of 2014, Alex completed 14 border crossings over the 
course of seven years, all in the Arizona – Sonora corridor. The frequency of these 
crossings enabled him to gain insight on how cartels rationalized clandestine 
crossings along the Sonora – Arizona border region.  
The control of border cities provides cartels leverage to pressure patrones 
and independent smugglers to pay a derecho de piso, a quota or user’s fee for 
crossing the border; the further from the Mexico-US border crossing clients 
originate, the more cartels may charge for access to the border. Patrones provide 
coyotes with a location, controlled by a drug cartel, where clients pay up to $600 
USD to enter a safe house. To opt-out and gain authorization to leave the safe 
house requires an additional $600 USD. These fees are in addition to the $4,000 
to $4,500 USD charged per Central American client to cross the Mexico-US 
border.  
 For one to three weeks prior to departure from the safe house, Alex scouts 
border authorities’ patrol patterns. Clients are then transported from the safe house 
by raiteros (slang for a driver) on a four-hour journey in Mexican territory controlled 
by a cartel. To prevent stowaways, heavily armed guards that work for cartels 
inspect each vehicle to make a final count of all passengers. To ensure that 
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patrones pay the right amount for each client, all are periodically asked to provide 
information on their place of origin. Once all passengers are accounted for, and 
place of origin is confirmed, permission is granted to continue to their next 
destination. In one instance, however, Alex described how a cartel identified 
discrepancies in the place of origin of some clients. The cartel leader, displeased 
with the attempt by a patrón to pay less than the required amount for a derecho de 
piso, alerted all cartels to discontinue business with this patrón.  
 The unequal power relations in the illicit informal economy of human 
smuggling that privilege drug cartels and patrones, who take a larger cut of the 
fees paid by migrants, and place coyotes at risk of death or incarceration by 
immigration authorities became all too clear as Alex shared information about his 
experiences facilitating clandestine cross border migration. 
 
Clandestine Crossings 
Alex’s numerous clandestine crossings allowed him to gain experience as 
an independently contracted coyote who participated in a spatially segmented 
smuggling network. Alex quickly established a strong reputation for guiding 
migrants safely across the border. The following provides a snapshot to one of 
these crossings. 
In 2014, Alex and Omar, worked together to guide ten foreign nationals 
across the Mexico-US border. Six hours into the journey in the Arizona desert, 
dehydration and fatigue set in. Unable to reach their designated pick-up point on 
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time, Alex called the raitero to inform him of their predicament and decision to hide 
overnight in the desert bush. They agreed to meet the next day at a new location.  
Day became night, and without warning, a helicopter and border patrol 
vehicles appeared near their location. Alex suspected the immigration authorities 
overheard his conversation with electronic monitoring and identified his location. 
The group dispersed throughout the bush. Once immigration authorities left, Alex 
and Omar searched for group members, but could not find them. Omar suggested 
leaving them behind, but Alex – fearing they would die without assistance – 
refused. It took several hours before they were found safe and sound asleep.  
 At dawn the group moved close to the pick-up point, but as a precaution 
remained in the bush. Once again, without warning, a helicopter and a border 
patrol caravan appeared at the designated site. The raitero never came, and a 
poor telephone signal prevented communication. For a second night, the group 
remained in the desert where they were in desperate need of water. Alex 
volunteered to go to a nearby community to search for sustenance. After some 
failed attempts to find residents at home, an elderly woman and her adult son who 
happened to be of the Tohono O’odham Nation – a binational indigenous group 
and federally recognized tribe – opened their door.  
Alex’s limited English prompted him to call his wife in Mexico (who 
completed seven years of schooling in the US) to translate his request for water, 
food, and one night’s lodging for group members. The hosts agreed to a stay of 
just two hours and provided nourishment at a cost of $500 USD. Alex called 
associates to arrange for another raitero to pick them up. Michael, a raitero and 
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member of the O’odham Nation, was identified as their only option – at the cost of 
$2,300 USD. Due to the high risk of detection by immigration agents, both coyotes 
accepted the offer on behalf of the group, but the fee significantly reduced their 
earnings.   
 Once in the vehicle, Alex negotiated – with his wife over the phone – a new 
business deal with Michael: future transportation services at a fee of $1,000 USD 
per passenger. Migrants, not coyotes, would have to cover the additional cost. Alex 
calculated that collaboration with Michael – with established networks and 
familiarity with O’odham Nation territory – reduced the risk of capture by 
immigration authorities and future financial losses. Ultimately, Michael agreed to 
partner in the human smuggling trade.  
Alex explained how Michael, to diminish the risk of imprisonment for his role 
in human smuggling, subcontracted duties to other O’odham members to transport 
Alex’s clients across the border. An element of risk, however, underlined their 
newfound business relationship. For example, Alex disclosed an instance when, 
under the cover of night, border patrol pursued him and new raitero in a car chase 
as they attempted to transport eight migrants across the border. Once at a safe 
distance, the raitero stopped the vehicle to allow everyone to disperse. Unable to 
chase everyone, the agent arrested the raitero and impounded the vehicle.  
 Michael arranged for another raitero to pick them up, but demanded that 
Alex pay the impounding fee and the bail amount needed to release his raitero. 
Initially, Alex refused, arguing that the raitero was at fault for speeding and bringing 
suspicion to the vehicle, but soon relented. He recognized that entry to the US 
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depended on Michael’s cooperation, and paid the fees. US citizenship status 
provides Michael, and his associates involved in human smuggling, a degree of 
protection from deportation, but places Alex at a disadvantage when negotiating 
financial transactions with O’odham. Imprisonment for aiding and abetting 
unauthorized entry of foreign nationals to the US, however, is an on-going risk for 
US citizens.  
 US and Mexican disinvestment in indigenous borderlands according to 
historian Gerardo Cadava (2011) fueled smuggling among the O’odham. The 
economic impact of governmental neglect is captured in a study by the Arizona 
Rural Policy Institute (2011), which identifies high rates of unemployment and 
poverty (27 and 41 percent, respectfully) among the O’odham. The O’odham 
borderlands, according to Cadava (2011), contrast with official ports of entry where 
free market capitalistic exchange is viewed as a modern neoliberal advancement. 
In this frame, the informal cross-border forms of exchange among the O’odham 
and coyotes, such as Alex, reinforce ideas of disorder and backwardness in the 
borderlands and justify their neglect.  
 While the O’odham nation formally observes US border enforcement laws, 
many feel conflicted. Journalist Andrea Filzen (2013) identifies how economic 
marginalization and ethnic profiling by CBP agents of O’odham tribe members fuel 
resentment toward them. Amnesty International (2012) has documented several 
cases whereby CBP agents racially profiled, harassed, denied entry and “returned” 
registered O’odham and other indigenous peoples to Mexico. These 
circumstances, along with rampant marginalization by the American and Mexican 
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governments, helps diminish the us-them distinction between the O’odham and 
migrants, perchance making partnerships such as Alex's and Michael's possible.   
 
 
The Unauthorized Re-entry  
 
The movement of people without state authorization is a dynamic and 
historically contingent process. Contemporary immigration enforcement measures 
throughout the Americas (Villegas and Rieteg 2015) have placed deportees and 
their involuntary transnational families in increased precarity (Bengtson et al. 
2013). It is this increased marginalization that forces many deportees to re-enter 
the US. The US enforcement strategy along the Mexico-US border and interior 
(Coleman 2007, Steil and Ridgley 2012), however, has involved increased 
convictions for unlawful re-entry – a federal crime – along with a rise in 
incarceration rates and deportations (Light, Hugo Lopez, and Gonzalez-Barrera 
2014).  
In 2014, Grace disclosed how they discussed the possibility of returning to 
the US soon after her return to Mexico. But, now with four children, their plans 
changed. I asked Grace what she thought about the prospect of Alex continuing to 
work as a coyote. Anticipating my question, she motioned, nodding her head 
sideways while holding her temples, and replied:  
“I don’t want him to do it anymore. Every time that he does, I remain worried 
with the stress that something horrible might happen to him. It is for this 
reason that I much rather he goes to the US to find employment.”  
When asked if he considered this option, he replied,  
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“I’m undecided.”  
I then asked how long he planned to work as a coyote, Alex answered: “The 
increased cost of living, and lack of employment [outside of the informal economy], 
require that I do another trip.” Mexico’s high unemployment (Aristegui Editorial 
Board 2014) along with institutionalized racism that disadvantage the indigenous 
in the labor market (De La Madrid 2012), and Alex’s commitment as a husband 
and father who prefers to spend time with his family informed his decision continue 
working as a coyote. The risks associated with this line of work, however, became 
evident with the increased difficulty Alex faced when crossing the Mexican-US 
border.  
 By the end of 2014, Alex attempted to guide 18 migrants through the Sonora 
- Arizona corridor, but before leaving Mexico armed men surrounded the group 
and confiscated their belongings. Alex ran into the desert bush and escaped in the 
US side of the border. After a night in the desert, without food or water, Alex 
returned to Sonora, Mexico, where he asked a fellow coyote to contact his patrón 
to find out the whereabouts of the migrants, and learned that hostages were 
released after US kin paid an undisclosed ransom. Alex returned to Chiapas and 
informed Grace and his parents of the incident; all insisted that he no longer 
continue to work as a coyote. 
 Alex heeded his family’s request, and in 2015, Alex and Grace decided to 
join kin members in the US, where both could accrue more earnings for the upkeep 
of their family. Alex paid a fellow coyote to cross his wife and children (including 
their US citizen child). This coyote informed Alex of successfully crossing mothers 
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and their children in a location on the border where US immigration officials 
captured and later released migrants.  
This development on the border reflected a change in DHS enforcement 
practices; a Federal Court Judge rejected (Preston 2015) use of private detention 
centers for children and their parents – hastily opened soon after the 2014 media 
coverage of a reported “surge” of arrivals from Central America – as a “deterrence” 
strategy to discourage future migration.  
Alex and Grace agreed to follow this strategy, which in addition to 
minimizing the risk of fatigue and death in the desert, was also less expensive. 
Alex, to help finance the cost for his family’s crossing, decided to make a final 
clandestine crossing with eight migrants in the Sonora – Arizona corridor. Hours 
after beginning their journey, heavily armed men captured and held them hostage 
in a secluded building. A ransom was requested from US kin for every migrant. 
Despite Alex’s request to pay the ransom for his release, his captors refused. 
Instead, Alex remained captive for an extended time period and physically tortured.  
 He escaped his captors, but as he was without food or water, he turned 
himself in to CBP agents who documented the physical wounds he sustained 
following his prolonged torture and placed him in detention. Grace, who remained 
without news of her husband’s whereabouts, became increasingly worried that he 
may have been detained by CBP agents, captured by rival coyotes, or perished in 
the desert, and requested my help to find Alex.  
I searched for and covered the cost of a reputable attorney who located 
Alex in a detention center and obtained his consent for legal counsel. Alex 
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expressed a well-founded fear of persecution or torture upon return to Mexico. 
However, his previous unauthorized entry prompted a Reinstatement of Removal, 
a new provision under the IIRIRA, which reestablished the previous order of 
removal subsequent to the 2006 immigration raid. Alex faced criminal charges for 
unauthorized reentry and – following a 2009 “detention bed mandate” passed by 
the US Congress, requiring ICE to fill 34,000 beds in detention facilities across the 
country (Robbins 2013) – prolonged imprisonment.  
 The attorney advised him of the option to apply for a withholding of removal 
or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Unlike asylum, 
however, both of these remedies do not offer a path to permanent resident status 
(Campos et al. 2014, 5). Additionally, a withholding and CAT application required 
that Alex remain in detention (potentially 6 months to a year) during the course of 
the credible fear process. Scholars have noted how prolonged detention can 
exacerbate post-traumatic stress and other harms asylum seekers and their 
families may have suffered in their own countries (Campos et al. 2014, 7-8). With 
no guarantee that the legal process would result in Alex’s release following his 
prolonged detention, in opposition to his wife and parents, who feared for his life 
should he be deported to Mexico, he refused legal counsel. Under such 
constrained legal options that denied access to asylum or permanent resident 
status, and additional detention to adjudicate a withholding and CAT application, 
following the end of Alex’s sentence and deportation, he opted to remigrate to 
reunite with his wife and children in the US.  
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Discussion and Conclusion 
This article used a case study method to present a “thick description” 
(Marcus 1998) of the human consequences that befall an involuntary transnational 
family created by US immigration enforcement. Specifically, I document how the 
2006 deportation of Alex produced a chain of events that resulted in multiple 
returns as a human smuggler (coyote) and participation in a larger clandestine 
border-crossing network.  
The changing dynamics of the clandestine political economy create 
conditions where coyotes, must not only evade border patrol, but also rival 
smugglers, and cartels that vie for greater control of the border region. Increased 
border surveillance by these actors has restructured the relational embeddedness 
that once shaped the coyote-migrant relationship. Alex’s collaboration with 
patrones throughout Central America, Mexico and the US who contact him to 
smuggle migrants to the US, is illustrative of the transnational scope of the 
dispersed flexible network that scholars (Palacios 2012, Ortiz 2016) have noted 
increasingly orders the clandestine political economy.  
The complex spatially segmented systems (Ortiz 2016) that order 
clandestine cross border migration are unstable and can involve a variety of 
different independent contractors. The power relations between these contractors 
can also be unequal. This is evidenced by the different roles played by patrones, 
coyotes, enganchadores, and raiteros. Each face varying degrees of risk for 
participating in human smuggling, particularly along the Arizona-Sonora border 
region where cartels and immigration authorities vie for control. To reduce the risk 
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of capture by border patrol or cartels, Alex partnered with Michael, a member of 
the Tohono O’odham Nation. Michael’s national origin and US citizenship granted 
a degree of protection from deportation, which he leveraged to negotiate financial 
transactions that disadvantaged Alex. The increased complexity of the cross-
border migration system that involved additional O’odham subcontractors and 
expenses, informed Alex’s decision to redirect the added costs to migrants.  
It is important to note, that I am not arguing that it is common for cartels or 
federally recognized tribes in the US to be involved in clandestine crossings. 
Instead, I argue that cartel activity and bolstered border enforcement measures 
have created conditions that disturb the normative relational embeddedness that 
underpinned the coyote-migrant relationship to a dispersed transnational flexible 
network. This diffusion has coincided with record number of US deportations.  
One of the US government’s arguments for bolstered immigration 
enforcement is that it will deter future unauthorized migration. Deterrence 
strategies – detention and “fast track” removal procedures – illegal under 
international and domestic law (2015), are ineffective in reducing the intention to 
migrate, particularly among those with direct experience with crime and violence 
who have credible fear claims (Hiskey et al. 2016). Deportations for instance have 
been found to reinforce structural economic and political inequalities that 
compound the needs of deportees (Coutin 2010, McGuire and Coutin 2013).  
Paradoxically, deterrence has produced a deportee population, many of whom 
have involuntary transnational families in the US, providing a profound inducement 
– family reunification – for remigration.  
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Scholars have begun to identify how deportees who are separated from kin 
are more likely to remigrate and rely less on US-specific social capital to attempt 
reentry (Cardoso et al. 2016). While reliance on US-specific social capital, which 
helps lower overhead costs to migration, may be of marginal importance to 
deportees separated from family members already in the US, the clandestine 
political economy remains a site where other forms of social capital may be 
leveraged by deportees to remigrate. This site, however, is undergoing significant 
change creating conditions that place those who participate in the informal 
clandestine economy vulnerable to multiple forms of violence. 
These forms of violence are increasingly illegible by migrant receiving states 
(Echeverria et al. 2015). Alex’s violent torture constituted grounds for credible fear. 
While several scholars have identified how most smugglers are migrants or asylum 
seekers themselves (Stone-Cadena 2016, Maher 2016), those who have credible 
fear claims face increased obstacles to exercise humanitarian protections by the 
US state (Menjívar and Rumbaut 2008).13  
 The limited legal options to seek asylum and humanitarian protection for 
individuals who have credible fear claims14 is evidenced by the marginal number 
(between 1% and 7%) of applicants from Mexico and Central America who receive 
asylum (Campos et al. 2014, 13). Moreover, due to provisions under the IIRIRA, 
individuals who are deported and subsequently reenter, are barred from applying 
                                                     
13 Along with the US, the wealthiest receiving countries of international migrants have all refused 
to ratify the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of 
their Families. See, Menjívar and Rumbaut (2008). 
14 As of January 2015, of the credible fear interviews conducted at family detention facilities of 
foreign nationals, 76% from El Salvador, 55% from Guatemala, 70% from Honduras, and 67% 
from Mexico established a credible fear (USCIS 2015). 
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for asylum (except for withholding of removal or CAT protection) and face a 
reinstatement of their previous order of removal. In the absence of effective 
humanitarian protections that uphold the fundamental right to family life, deportees 
who are separated from families may have a greater propensity than those without 
involuntary transnational families to remigrate. Alex’s case provides an opportunity 
to understand the complex motivations that fuel the migration of unintended 
returnees, particularly when it concerns family reunification.  
 The importance of studying unintended returnees as a unique mobility 
subject is amplified when we examine US deportations between 2005-2013. 
During this period, the US deported over 3.1 million unauthorized migrants (DHS 
2013). Of this number, using the Capps et al. (2007) two-to-one ratio to calculate 
the number of children impacted by US deportations,15 we can estimate over 1.5 
million children living in the US have been impacted by these removals. Moreover, 
based on DHS (2009) data on repeat violations, which identifies more than a third 
of repeat violations committed by parents of US-citizen children, we can 
reasonably predict that a large proportion of the 3.1 million removals may remigrate 
to reunify with involuntary transnational families in the US. The staggering number 
of deportations of parents of US-citizen children – one fourth of all removals 
between 2010 and 2012 (Wessler 2012) – who have a greater propensity to 
remigrate to reunify with families (DHS 2009),  should give pause to immigration 
policies that prioritize enforcement measures over humanitarian protection (Vélez 
and Boehner 2014). 
                                                     
15 The Capps et al. (2007) study found that for every two adults apprehended in a work site raid, 
at least one child (two thirds of whom are US-born citizens) is impacted. 
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While my findings are not generalizable, the strength of this qualitative case 
study lies in its ability to document how deterrence as a strategy for immigration 
enforcement paradoxically enabled Alex – with established long-term residence in 
the US – entrée to a human smuggling network. As a coyote, Alex deployed 
clandestinity as a resource to operate within the interstices of the dominant 
systems of migration, linked in both complicit and marginal ways to lawful migration 
to the US and the contemporary system of human smuggling. Findings also reveal 
how, despite bolstered immigration enforcement and limited legal options to seek 
asylum, clandestinity remained a viable, albeit dangerous, strategy enabling Alex 
to surreptitiously renter the US to reunify with his family. 
To conclude, returnees and recent arrivals are increasingly systematically 
denied basic human rights in the US producing unauthorized persons/families who 
are at risk of deportation for years to come. Current US immigration enforcement 
policies are not only ineffective in deterring future migrations, but actually fuel 
emergent migrations that may increasingly rely on non-relationally embedded 
clandestine smuggling networks. These changes – enforcement and changes in 
clandestine smuggling networks – place returnees and recent arrivals in greater 
vulnerability as they attempt to migrate to the US. In lieu of deportations, policies 
that address structural inequalities in places of origin may curb unauthorized entry 
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